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PECUNIARY, NON-PECUNIARY, AND DOWNSTREAM RESEARCH SPILLOVERS: 





This paper develops an empirical framework for estimating a number of inter-firm and downstream 
research spillovers in the canola crop research industry.  The spillovers include basic research, human 
capital/ knowledge (as measured through other-firm expenditures), and genetics (as measured through 
yields of other-firms). The model used to examine spillover effects on research productivity provides 
evidence that there are many positive inter-firm non-pecuniary research spillovers, which is consistent 
with a research clustering effect. The second model, which examines spillovers at the level of firm 
revenue, shows that, while private firms tend to crowd one another, public firm expenditure on basic 
and applied research creates a crowding-in effect for private firms. This model also shows that 
enhanced intellectual property rights have increased the revenues of private firms. The third model, 
which examines social value of each firm’s output, provides evidence that downstream research 
spillovers remain important in this modern crop research industry.  
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PECUNIARY, NON-PECUNIARY, AND DOWNSTREAM RESEARCH SPILLOVERS: 
THE CASE OF CANOLA 
1.0 Introduction 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) have fundamentally altered the nature of agricultural 
research spillovers. During most of the 20
th century, the public good attributes of research were 
recognized as a spillover, with the result that most crop research was undertaken by public institutions 
and the products of the research were held in the public domain (Huffman and Evenson, 1993). The 
ability of modern biotechnology to identify DNA, combined with regulatory and judicial moves to 
enhance IPRs, has reduced these spillovers, resulting in substantial private investment in agricultural 
research (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2004).  The inherent non-rival nature of research products, along with 
freedom to operate costs, has led to rapid consolidation and a concentrated agricultural research 
industry (see, e.g., Lindner, 1999; Fulton and Giannakas, 2001), so much so that US antitrust 
regulators have made recent biotech acquisitions subject to divestiture in order to limit market 
concentration (Schimmelpfennig, Pray, and Brennam, 2004). At the same time, more than 200 public 
research institutions have moved to create offices of technology transfer to manage access to their 
intellectual property (Graff et al., 2003) and national governments have passed laws to protect 
landrace genetics (Evenson, 1999; Falcon and Fowler, 2002).  The combination of these effects 
represents a watershed of change within the agricultural research industry.  
The change in crop research has been particularly evident in the Canadian canola industry. 
After three decades of public leadership, the canola industry has become dominated by large private 
firms employing biotechnology to produce tailored products for the marketplace. Since 1985, the 
private sector has funded about 60% of the total investment in research, and owned 85% of the new 
varieties  (Gray, Malla, and Phillips, 2002). By the year 2000, 75% of the canola acreage was planted 
to varieties that required farmers to make annual purchases to retain access to the technology (Malla, 
Gray, and Phillips, 2003). Despite the importance of these changes in crop research, a lack of firm-
specific data hampered the analysis and understanding of the biotech industry.  
This study uses firm-specific data in the Canadian canola industry to examine a number of 
research spillovers among public and private firms. The effect of “spill-ins” is examined at the firm 
level in terms of their impact on research output, sales revenue, and a measure of downstream 
“social” value. The potential sources of pecuniary and non-pecuniary spillovers examined include 
basic research by public institutions, human capital and knowledge (as measured through other-firm 
expenditures), and genetic spillovers (as measured through variety yields of other-firms).  Inferences 
about downstream spillovers and market-driven pecuniary spillovers are made from a comparison of 
the estimated relationships.  
The methodological contribution of the paper is to develop a set of empirical models that 
distinguish between many types of potential spillovers within a crop research industry. Empirically 
we are able to show that positive inter-firm and downstream research spillovers have been important 
in the modern canola research industry and that public basic and applied research has caused a 
“crowding in” of private research activities.    
The remainder of the paper is organized into three sections.  Section 2 outlines relevant 
literature. Section 3 describes the theoretical framework used for this analysis. The empirical model 
and the results are reported in Section 4.  Section 5 contains the concluding comments of the paper.   
 
2. Research Spillovers 
Research spillovers are central to the economics of research.  These externalities that arise 
from the public good aspects of knowledge are an important determinant of economic productivity 
(e.g., Griliches, 1992; Jaffe, 1986; Adams 1990). The non-rival nature of research output have 
assumed a central role in endogenous growth theory, both in terms of physical capital (e.g., Romer 
1986, 1990; Aghion and Howitt 1992) and human capital (e.g., Lucas, 1988).  Spillovers also have 
important implications for firm behaviour (e.g., Adams, 2000; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Just and 2 
Hueth, 1993; Moschini and Lapan, 1997) and industrial organization (e.g., Spence, 1984; Dasgupta 
and Stiglitz, 1980; Levis and Reiss, 1984, 1988; Fulton, 1997; Lessor, 1997; Fulton and Giannakas, 
2001), and industrial structure (Acs et al., 1994; Schimmelpfinnig, Pray, and Brennan, 2004).  
A significant body of economic research has addressed the spillovers from public research by 
examining the crowding effects of public research investment on private research investment. Roberts 
(1984), Bergstrom et al. (1986), and David and Hall (2000) argue that publicly funded research 
competes for scarce resources and therefore could “crowd out” privately funded research. Other 
economists who have considered charitable donations (e.g., Khanna et al., 1995, Khanna and Sandler 
1996) show that public expenditure could have the opposite effect and cause a “crowding in” of 
private research expenditure. David, Hall and Toole (1999) provided a recent survey of the available 
empirical evidence and found that the results were inconclusive in terms of the direction and the 
magnitude of the relationship between public and private research expenditure.   
The effects of spillovers on agricultural productivity have also attracted significant attention 
in the literature (e.g., Johnson and Evenson, 1999; Griliches, 1979; 1980; Evenson 1989; Huffman 
and Evenson, 1993; White, He, and Fletcher, 2003), while a number of studies examined the cross-
state spillovers from agricultural research (e.g., Evenson, 1989; Yee and Huffman, 2001; Alston and 
Pardey, 1996).   
Some economists have distinguished between the various sources of research spillovers. 
Pardey et al. (1996) examined the genetic research spillovers through pedigree attribution among 
different breeding programs, which applies when crop pedigrees are known (Heisey and Morris 
2002).  The seminal work of Evenson and Kislev (1976) introduced the notion of basic research 
spillovers, using a theoretical model where the outputs of basic research (i.e., scientific knowledge) 
improve the productivity of the search process (i.e., applied research).  This concept was used in a 
number of later studies (e.g., Lee 1982, 1985; Kortum, 1997). Diamond (1999) and Robson (1993) 
empirically examined the crowding effects of basic research.  Finally, a number of studies have 
recognized that knowledge is embodied in human capital and that spillovers occur with the education 
of workers (e.g. Shultz, 1975, Lucas 1993), learning from others ( Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; 
Thorton and Thompson, 2001), and with the mobility of workers (Glaeser et al.,1992). 
To estimate inter-industry spillovers it is important to distinguish between pecuniary 
spillovers and non-pecuniary spillovers.  Pecuniary spillovers are the firm-to-firm interactions that 
occur through prices in a properly functioning market as the firms purchase inputs, and sell output.  
Non-pecuniary spillovers are the non-market impacts of a firm’s actions on other firms. These 
spillovers typically exist because of poorly defined property rights or other forms of market failure. 
These spillovers are the focus of most economic analysis, because they distort private incentives away 
from efficient marginal conditions. The combined effects of pecuniary and non-pecuniary spillovers 
are important because they measure the net effect of a firm’s actions on its rivals.  When the 
combined spillover from an increase in output is negative, firms will tend to “crowd out” their rivals.  
In the case of positive combined spillovers this will tend to create a “crowding in” of other firms, or a 
research clustering effect.  
 
3. Modelling the Impact of Research Spillovers 
In Canada’s canola industry both public and private research firms expend resources to 
develop enhanced canola varieties. Private firms engage in applied research to produce enhanced crop 
varieties, which are sold to farmers.  Public institutions (firms) also engage in a significant amount of 
basic research, which creates knowledge that is used to improve crop research processes.  The 
varieties created by public firms are distributed through the private seed industry in return for royalty 
payments.  
The empirical model considers several possible pecuniary and non-pecuniary spillovers, 
which are illustrated in Figure 1.  The solid arrows in the figure represent both upstream and 
downstream market linkages, which are the source of pecuniary spillovers. The potential non-3 
pecuniary spillovers are shown as dashed arrows.  The non-pecuniary spillover between the firms and 
the downstream industry (labelled as 1) are those benefits provided to those firms and consumers that 
are outside of the market (e.g., benefits associated with farmers retaining seed of a new variety for the 
next year). The possible combinations of inter-firm non-pecuniary spillovers are labelled separately 
and shown as: private to private, 2a; private to public, 2b; public to private, 2c; and public to public, 
2d. These inter-firm non-pecuniary spillovers can be further broken into: i) spillovers generated from 
the germplasm of other firms,  ii) spillovers generated from knowledge created  by the applied 
research of other firms, and iii) spillovers generated from the knowledge created by the basic research 
of public firms.
1  
{Figure 1 goes about here} 
In the econometric model to follow, we model the firm-to-firm spillovers in three different 
models: Model 1) at the level of each firm’s production function for new varieties; Model 2) at the 
level of each firm’s sales revenue; and Model 3) at the level of the social benefits embodied in each 
firm’s varieties. Model 1 allows us to isolate the inter-firm non- pecuniary spillover effects. Model 2, 
based on revenue, will capture both the non-pecuniary spillovers and the pecuniary spillovers 
generated by the other firms in the output market, providing an indication of the crowding effects.   
The measure of firm output in Model 3 includes the spillovers to downstream firms and consumers, 
giving an indication of some of the social impacts of inter-firm spillovers.  In the estimation we make 
a further distinction between public and private research enterprises such that the inter-firm spillovers 
within the public or private sector are potentially different than the private-pubic spillovers. 
 Model 1: 
Research outputs, the dependent variables in Model 1, are measured as the average yield of new 
varieties sold by each firm each year. The production function of each research firm is described by 
the function:   
Yit = f (Yi,t−1,ARi,t−k,BRt−l,OARi,t−r,OYi,t−m)
++ + ++ ,                      (1) 
where Yit  is the average yield of new varieties of firm i in year t, which is an increasing function of 
the previous period’s yield, Yi.t–1, lagged own applied research, ARi.t–k,
2 and, through non-pecuniary 
spillovers, an increasing function of lagged basic research expenditures, BR.t–m, lagged applied 
expenditure of other-firms, OARi.t–r, and the lagged yield of other-firms, OYi.t–m,.   
  In Model 1 the derivative of output with respect to the own applied research is the single-year 
marginal product (in terms of yield increase) of an additional unit of applied research. The derivative 
with respect to the lagged own yield represents the marginal persistence effect. The marginal impact 
of the spillovers on a firm’s output, from public basic research, its rival’s applied research, and its 
rivals’ yield levels, are also captured in the derivative of the function.    
Model 2: 
The dependent variables in this model are the revenues of each firm i in each year t, which consists of 
the sum of sales revenue and technical use fees. The revenue generated will be a function of those 
variables that affect variety yields, as well as the variables that measure IPRs and the pecuniary 
effects of competition. Specifically,   
              Ri,t = g(Ri,t−1,ARi,t−k,PBRt,HYBi.t,TUREVi,t,BRt−l,OARi,t−r,OYi,t−g)
++ + + + ?? ?
.   (2) 
In this case sales revenue, Ri,t, is an increasing function of  last year’s revenue, Ri,j–1 , own lagged 
applied research, ARi,t–k, plant breeders’ rights, PBRt , the proportion of area seeded to varieties 
requiring annual repurchase, HYBit, and technical use revenue, TUREVi,t. The latter three variables 
measure strengthened IPRs and greater ability to capture revenue, and therefore each should be 
positive. The spillovers from lagged basic research, BRt–l, other-firms’ applied research expenditure, 
AORi,t–k, and yield of other-firms’ varieties, OYi,t–g, could be positive (negative) if the non-pecuniary 
effects are greater (less) than the pecuniary spillovers. For Model 2, the derivatives of the function 
represent the private marginal revenue effects. 4 
  
Model 3: 
This model estimates the production of social revenue associated with the varieties sold by each firm.   
In this case, the annual social benefit is approximated as the increase in economic surplus generated 
from the yield’s increases plus the herbicide savings rent. The economic surplus attributed to yield is 
estimated as the yield increase on the area sown to the firm’s varieties multiplied by prevailing canola 
prices.  The spillovers at this level will include both pecuniary and non-pecuniary inter-firm 
spillovers, as well as the downstream spillovers.   The social revenue for firm i in period t can be 
described as: 
          SRi,t = k(SRi,t−1,ARi,t−k,PBRt,BRt−l,OARi,t−r,)
++ ?? ?
.       ( 3 )  
 Social  revenue,  SRi,t,, is expected to be an increasing function of the firm’s lagged applied 
research, ARi,t–k, and  the previous period social revenue, SRi,t–1. The market-correcting effect of plant 
breeders’ rights, PBRt, is ambiguous in the presence of other spillovers, given Lancaster’s argument 
of the second best. The spillovers from lagged basic research, BRt–l, and other-firms’ lagged applied 
research, OARi,t–r, will be negative (positive) if the social pecuniary effects are greater (less) than non-
pecuniary spillover effects. The derivatives of Equation 3 represent the marginal impacts of each 
variable firm on the sum of firm revenue and downstream spillovers.  
 
4. Econometric Analysis 
4.1 Data and Econometric Model Specification 
The data used for the econometric analysis came from many industry and government sources 
and in some cases took considerable calculation to construct each of the variables used for the 
econometric analysis.  We were able to construct a data set for five private firms  and two public 
institutions. The primary data source for research expenditures was a survey of the Canola Industry 
(Canola Research Survey, 1999).  These data sources and the methodology used to construct each 
variable are described in Appendix A.  
We used three different models for the analysis of research spillovers. To separate  research 
spillovers effects in public firms and private firms, we divided the firms into two groups: private 
firms and public firms. In the first model, we considered the following specification: 
Model 1: 
Yi,t
PV = β0i + β1ARi,t−k
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where we assume that  1 < i γ  and  1 < j γ , for all i, j to ensure stationary, and 
PV
t i Y ,  = Annual weighted yield index of private firm i in year t  
PUB
t j Y ,  = Annual weighted yield index of public firm j in year t  
l t BR −  = Basic research expenditures in year t–l (same for all 7 firms) 
PV
k t i AR − ,  = Private applied research expenditures of firm i in year t–k 
PUB
k t j AR − ,  = Public applied research expenditures of firm j in year t–k 
PV
r t i OAR − ,  = Total applied research expenditures of other-private firms excluding firm i in year t–r 5 
PUB
r t j OAR − ,  = Total applied research expenditures of other-pubic firms excluding firm j at year t–r 
PV
m t AR −  = Total applied research expenditures of private firms in year t–m 
PUB
m t AR −  = Total applied research expenditure of public firms in year t–m 
PUB
g t Y −  = Annual weighted yield index of private firms at year t–g 
PV
g t Y −  = Annual weighted yield index of public firms at year t–g 
PV
h t i OY − ,  = Total yield index of private firms excluding firm i in year t–h 
PUB
h t j OY − ,  = Total yield index of public firms excluding firm j in year t–h 
t j t i u u , , ,  = Random error terms, assumed to have multivariate normal with mean vector zero and 
covariance matrix Ω 
This model consists of a system of 7 equations of seemingly unrelated regression: 5 for 
private firms and 2 for public firms. Some interesting practical features of the model are worth 
mentioning. First, each of the equations in the system contains its own-lag of the dependent variable, 
so the system is dynamic. Second, given the limitation of the current data set, we have imposed cross-
equation restrictions on both private and public firms. This enables us to adequately estimate the 
parameters of the system. Finally, we did not represent each equation with a general distributed lag 
model. We chose a simpler lag structure, looking for a single lag for each variable, assuming that it 
will take at least 4 years from basic research and 6 years from applied research for the first successful 
yield to be adopted. Indeed, we have tried to specify a more general system of autoregressive 
distributed lag model (SADL) and we did not find any significance for the recent lag structures. 
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Model 3: 
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where, we assume again,  1 < i λ ,  1 < j λ ,  1 < i ρ  and  1 < j ρ  for all i, j, and  
PV
t i R ,  = Revenue of private firm i in year t, 
PUB
t j R ,  = Revenue of public firm i in year t, 
PV
t i SR ,  = Social revenue of private firm i in year t, 6 
PUB
t j SR ,  = Social revenue of public firm i in year  t, 
PV
t i HYB , = The proportion of the total area seeded to hybrid (HYB) varieties for private firm i at time 
t, 
PUB
t j HYB ,  = The proportion of the total area seeded to hybrid (HYB) varieties for public firm j at time 
t, 
t PBR  = Plant Breeders’ Rights dummy for private/public firm in year t, 
PV
t i TUREV ,  = TUA (technical use agreement) revenue for private firm i in year t, 
PUB
t j TUREV ,  = TUA (technical use agreement) revenue for public firm j in year t,  
and other variables defined previously as in Model 1.  
 
The specifications of Models 2 and 3 are similar to those of Model 1 in terms of lag structure 
specifications. For each model, the unknown parameters in the dynamic system, in principle, can be 
easily estimated by Zellner’s Iterative SUR (ISUR) estimator. These estimates are consistent, 
asymptotically efficient, and numerically equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimator. 
The ISUR estimator uses equation-by-equation OLS to construct an estimate of the 
disturbance covariance matrix Ω  and then does the generalized least squares, given this initial 
estimate of Ω, on an appropriately stacked set of equations. The procedure is then iterated until the 
estimated parameters and the estimated Ωconverge. 
One estimation decision that arises in each model is how to choose the appropriate lag length. 
One simple way is to select the lag based on the minimum of the multivariate version of the Akaike 
Information Criterion (MAIC). Alternatively, given a special structure of the model, specifying 
different lags always results in the same number of the parameters. Consequently, minimizing the 
MAIC is equivalent to minimizing the determinant of residual covariance matrix. We have used this 
second approach to determine the appropriate lag length in each model. 
 
4.2 Regression Results 
The regression results for the three models reported in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3 appear to be 
robust.  Most of the estimated coefficients are individually statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level.  Almost all the explanatory variables have the expected signs.  The regressions have R 
2 
between 0.590 and 0.997 (first regression), 0.467 and 0.963 (second regression), 0.342 and 0.890 
(third regression).   
 
Model 1 
The firms’ own-lagged applied research expenditure has a positive effect on yield. The 
coefficient of 2.12 for private firms (0.601 for public firms) implies that a $1 million expenditure 
increases the yield index by 2.12 (0.601).  The much larger coefficient for the private firms suggests a 
higher direct productivity for private applied research.  For all firms, public and private, the previous 
years’ yields have positive signs, with coefficients less than one, and thus are consistent with dynamic 
stability. 
The empirical results reveal that lagged basic research expenditure positively affects the 
annual weighted yield index of private firms, while negatively affecting the weighted yield index of 
public firms.  Public basic research expenditure with a lag of nine periods has a coefficient of .304 in 
the first model, implying that, ceteris paribus, a $1 million increase in the annual public basic 
research in one year increases the private yield index after nine years by .304 index points.  This 
positive spillover is consistent with notion that basic research increases the productivity of private 
applied research.  In contrast to this result, a $1 million increase in the annual public basic research 
expenditure in one year reduces the public yield index after nine years by .2 index points.  This 7 
interesting result suggests that an increase in basic research, which is located within public 
institutions, uses common resources within the research institution, thereby reducing the resources 
available for applied public research.  
{Table 1 about here } 
Other-firms’ lagged research expenditures have a spillover effect on each firm’s yield index.  
The synergistic effect was strongest within groups, i.e. between public firms (.35) and between 
private firms (.32).  A somewhat smaller synergistic affect was evident between groups in the 
spillover of public expenditure on applied yields (.158).  These positive effects are consistent with 
human capital and knowledge spillovers. A negative spillover effect of .163 occurred between private 
firm expenditures and public firm yields. This latter between-group effect may have been generated 
from private firms bidding highly qualified personnel away from the public sector. During the growth 
phase of the industry, migration tended to occur from the public sector to the private sector. 
A positive spillover was evident for yields within group while the spillover was negative 
between groups.  A one-point increase in other-private (public) firms’ yield index resulted in a .9 
point (.036) increase in the firm’s own-yield index.  In contrast, the public yield index had a negative 
.448 point impact on private yield, while the reverse between-group impact was also negative but 
insignificant.  
The results of Model 1 show that a firm’s current yield index can be modelled as a function 
of previous research expenditure. The model revealed strong evidence of positive spillovers within 
the public and within the private sectors.  Publicly funded basic research and applied research created 
a positive spillover for private yields. Other-public/private spillovers were negative in sign. 
 
Model 2 
Model 2, which examines the determinants of firm revenue, revealed that one dollar of own-
firm lagged applied research increased private (public) revenue by $.480 ($.962). This model also 
showed important spillover effects. In this case the spillovers include pecuniary effects in the output 
market and therefore illuminate crowding effects.  An additional dollar in lagged basic research 
expenditure changed private (public) revenue by $.346 (–$.187), indicating that public basic research 
provides monetary benefits to private industry, while drawing resources away for public-firm applied 
research.   
{Table 2 about here} 
 The inter-firm spillover effects of lagged applied research were negative within groups.  A 
dollar increase in other-private (public) firm applied research expenditure reduced firm revenue by 
$.341 ($2.412). Given that there were positive spillovers in production, these negative impacts show a 
strong degree of competition within groups, which is not surprising since the firms are competing for 
the same customers.  
In contrast to the within-group competition, a $1 increase in public (private) expenditure 
increased private revenue by $.311 ($.278), indicating positive spillovers between groups.   This 
indicates that non-pecuniary spillovers dominate the pecuniary spillovers such that public applied 
research activity has crowded in private research, rather than crowding it out.  
The spillover of other-firms’ yields tends to have a negative impact on firm revenue.  This 
negative relationship exists among private firms, from private to public firms, and from public to 
private firms. The exception is the public-to-public interaction, where there is synergistic impact, 
perhaps due to a different ethos among public breeders.  
The variables for proportion of the total area seeded to hybrids and for plant breeders’ rights 
had a positive impact on private revenues, while having a negative impact on public revenue. A 
complete shift to hybrids would increase (reduce) private (public) revenue by $3.466 million ($3.996 
million) per year.  PBR increased (reduced) private (public) revenue by $5.592 million ($8.14 
million). The TUA fees had a positive affect on total revenue, .94 in the case of private firms, 
suggesting a slight reduction in the non-TUA revenue, while for the public firms a dollar in TUA 
revenue tended to increase total revenue by $7.738, indicating a dramatic increase in pricing. 8 
  In summary, Model 2, which examines firm revenue, shows evidence of the pecuniary 
impacts of competition between firms, particularly within groups. Applied expenditure within-group 
reduces other-firm revenue, while between-group spillovers are positive. A higher lagged yield for 
competing firms has a negative impact on revenue, with the exception of public-to-public impacts, for 
which it is positive.  Property rights and hybrid technologies have a positive effect on private sales 
revenue and a negative impact on public revenue.  
Model 3 
The estimates of Model 3 show how the social revenue associated with the varieties of each 
firm are affected by research expenditures and PBRs.  The results are similar in sign to the private 
revenue estimated in Model 2. 
The applied research investment in each firm increases the social revenue associated with its 
varieties.  In the case of private (public) firms a $1 increase in applied research resulted in an increase 
in social revenue of $1.846 ($5.236).  These figures are much larger than the increase in private 
revenue reported in Model 2, indicating a gap between private and social revenue and a significant 
positive spillover to downstream research users, particularly in the case of public applied research. 
{Table 3 about here} 
A $1 increase in lagged basic research increased (reduced) private (public) social revenue by 
$.806 ($5.727).  This indicates that the output of private firms is positively affected by basic research; 
the public variety output once again is a decreasing function of public basic research expenditure. 
The other-firms’ research expenditure has a negative impact within-group and a positive 
impact between groups@ 
A $1 increase in a private (public) firms competitor’s applied research reduced the firm’s 
associated social revenue by $1.962 ($6.243).  An increase in private (public) applied research 
increased the social revenue associated with public (private) varieties by $1.06 ($2.195).  Comparing 
the significantly smaller own-research impacts to the larger negative spillovers would suggest that an 
increase in applied research could have a negative impact social revenue. 
PBRs have a strong positive effect on the impact of private research and strong negative 
impact on the products of public applied research.  The estimates suggest that PBRs increased the 
social revenue associated with private varieties by $29.95 million while reducing revenue associated 
with public applied research by $42.47 million.  This is a very substantial shift and probably reflects 
other changes in research policy that coincided with PBRs, including the introduction of the practice 
of transferring public varieties to public firms for commercialization. 
In summary, Model 3 shows that the social revenue associated with the output of a firm can 
be estimated as a function lagged research expenditure and PBRs.  The results are consistent with 
Model 2 and show that competition within-group is much stronger than that between groups.  The fact 
that the estimated coefficients for social revenue from the own-applied research are greater than the 
private revenue coefficients suggests a significant spillover of benefits to downstream research users.  
The fact that the across-firm negative spillovers from applied research are greater than the positive 
own-firm effects suggests there could be an over expenditure in the industry.  The introduction of 




This study examined many research spillovers in a modern crop research industry as 
delineated by: their public or private source; their public or private incidence; whether they were 
generated through basic research, applied research activity, or germplasm; and whether they were 
inter-firm pecuniary, inter-firm non-pecuniary, or downstream in nature.   The empirical framework, 
which estimated a production function, a private revenue function and a social revenue, provided a 
useful conceptual separation of research spillovers, and provided a broad scope of empirical results 
with many implications for private incentives and research policy.  9 
The three empirical models fit the data well and provided theoretically plausible estimates.  
Lagged applied research investment by each firm increased research output, research revenue, social 
research revenue.  Enhanced IPRs increased private research revenue, and the social value of their 
innovations.  Perhaps the most striking general result was the ubiquitous presence of research 
spillovers in each model.   
The empirical results of Model 1 provide the strongest evidence of non-pecuniary spillovers. 
The results show that public basic research, public applied research, and other firm private applied 
research, and other private firm varieties, created a positive spillover for private firms.  These 
spillovers indicate that public research has made private research firms more productive, and private 
firms may benefit from the knowledge generated from their rivals. 
The empirical results of Model 2 provide estimates of the total (pecuniary  plus non-
pecuniary) research spillovers.  The results show that, while private firms have a net competitive or 
crowding-out effect, public firm basic and applied research enhances private revenue, creating a 
crowding-in effect.  This model also shows that plant breeders’ rights, proprietary technologies, and 
technical use agreements enhance private firms’ ability to generate revenue.  
Model 3 empirically estimates the social value of sales from each firm. The much larger 
coefficients than those estimated in Model 2 provide evidence of considerable downstream research 
spillovers in the canola industry.  Spillovers from public basic and applied research have enhanced 
the social value of firm output.   The large impact of the plants breeders’ rights represents a 
significant structural change that significantly increased the social value of private firms’ output while 
reducing the social value of sales from public institutions. 
  The results of the empirical analysis have several implications for research policy.  The most 
apparent is that public and private research firms are integrally linked through numerous types of 
research spillovers.  Publicly funded basic and applied research both had positive effects on private 
research productivity, profitability, and social value output. The negative impact of basic research on 
public firm output and revenue suggests that these basic research activities are underreported and tend 
to use resources earmarked for applied research. Given the importance of basic research to private 
industry output, this diversion of resources could be optimal.   The ability of public institutions to do 
applied research while crowding-in private applied research suggests that public policies such as the 
Matching Investment Initiative have been successful in mitigating the normal crowding effects. The 
positive impact that IPRs had on private revenue suggests that these changes have been effective in 
providing incentives for private research. 
  The prevalence of non-pecuniary inter-firm research spillovers suggests a strong research 
clustering effect—an effect that is particularly evident in Saskatoon where there is a significant 
concentration of public and private firms involved in canola research.  The existence of a clustering 
effect suggests the need for a mechanism for the co-ordination of private and public location choices 
to maximize the spillover opportunities. The significant public-to-private spillovers emphasize the 
importance of the public institutions in these clusters.  
  In this study we found empirical evidence of a variety of research spillovers in the canola 
research industry. The importance of research to economic growth suggests a need to fully understand 
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Figure 1:  Schematic of Research Spillovers in the Crop Research Industry 11 
Table 1: Regression Results of Model 1 
Dependent Variables: Annual weighted yield index of private firms i in year t : Yi,t
PVpublic firms: 
PUB
t i Y ,  
Variable Acronym   Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.
Private applied research expenditures in year t–6  PV
k t i AR − ,   1 β   2.116 8.171 0.000
Basic research expenditures in year t–9 
l t BR −   2 β   0.304 3.326 0.001
Total applied research expenditures of other-private 
firms in year t–6 
PV
r t i OAR − ,   3 β   0.320 3.813 0.000
Total applied research expenditures of public firms 
in year t–7 
PUB
m t AR −   4 β   0.158 1.831 0.069
Total yield index of private firms in year t–6  PV
h t i OY − ,   5 β   0.903 65.945 0.000
Yield index of public firms at year t–12  PUB
g t Y −   6 β   –0.448 -5.600 0.000
Public applied research expenditures in year t–6  PUB
k t j AR − ,   1 δ   0.601 2.087 0.038
Basic research expenditures in year t–9 
l t BR −   2 δ   –0.200 -1.734 0.085
Total applied research expenditures of other-public 
firms in year t–6 
PUB
r t j OAR − ,   3 δ   0.351 3.320 0.001
Total applied research expenditures of private firms 
in year t–7 
PV
m t AR −   4 δ   –0.163 -2.018 0.045
Total yield index of other-public firms in year t–6  PUB
h t j OY − ,   5 δ   0.036 2.297 0.023
Yield index of private firms at year t–12  PV
g t Y −   6 δ   0.000 -0.317 0.752
Yield index of private firm 1 in year t–1  PV
t Y 1 , 1 −   1 γ   0.067 4.221 0.000
Intercept private firm 1  constant 
01 β   37.665 5.128 0.000
Yield index of private firm 2 in year t–1  PV
t Y 1 , 2 −   2 γ   0.335 3.761 0.000
Intercept private firm 2  constant 
02 β   54.000 4.927 0.000
Yield index of private firm 3 in year t–1  PV
t Y 1 , 3 −   3 γ   0.479 6.419 0.000
Intercept private firm 3  constant 
03 β   48.706 4.758 0.000
Yield index of private firm 4 in year t–1  PV
t Y 1 , 4 −   4 γ   0.500 7.431 0.000
Intercept private firm 4  constant 
04 β   42.836 4.491 0.000
Yield index of private firm 5 in year t–1  PV
t Y 1 , 5 −   5 γ   0.500 6.697 0.000
Intercept private firm 5  constant 
05 β   47.323 4.712 0.000
Yield index of public firm 1 in year t–1  PUB
t Y 1 , 1 −   6 γ   0.521 5.251 0.000
Intercept public firm 1  constant 
06 δ   50.287 4.858 0.000
Yield index of public firm 2 in year t–1  PUB
t Y 1 , 2 −   7 γ   0.940 14.495 0.000
Intercept private firm 2  constant 
07 δ   -0.615 -0.131 0.896
Determinant residual covariance: 1.71E+12.   
2 R : 0.590 – 0.997 
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Table 2: Regression Results of Model 2 
Dependent Variable: Revenue of private firm i in year t: 
PV
t i R ,  public firm j in year t: 
PUB
t j R ,  
Variable  Acronym    Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Private applied research expenditures in year t–9  PV
k t i AR − ,   1 α   0.480 1.854 0.065
Basic research expenditures in year t–7 
l t BR −   2 α   0.346 2.777 0.006
Total applied research expenditures of other-
private firms in year t–9 
PV
r t i OAR − ,   3 α   –0.341 -1.852 0.066
Total applied research expenditures of public firms 
in year t–8 
PUB
m t AR −   4 α   0.311 2.725 0.007
Total yield index of other-private firms in year t–9  PV
h t i OY − ,   5 α   –0.309 -6.477 0.000
Yield index of public firms at year t–12  PUB
g t Y −   6 α   –0.305 -2.663 0.009
The proportion of the total area seeded to hybrid 
(HYB) varieties for private firm at time t 
PV
t i HYB ,   7 α   3.466 2.678 0.008
Plant Breeders’ Right dummy for private/public 
firm in year t 
t PBR   8 α   5.592 2.992 0.003
TUA (technical use agreement) revenue for private 
firm in year t 
PV
t i TUREV ,   9 α   0.943 11.966 0.000
Public applied research expenditures in year t–9  PUB
k t j AR − ,   2 θ   0.962 3.231 0.002
Basic research expenditures in year t–7 
l t BR −   1 θ   –0.187 -0.639 0.524
Total applied research expenditures of other-public 
firms in year t–9 
PUB
r t j OAR − ,   3 θ   –2.412 -4.159 0.000
Total applied research expenditures of private 
firms in year t–8 
PV
m t AR −   4 θ   0.278 1.050 0.295
Total yield index of other-public firms in year t–9  PUB
h t j OY − ,   5 θ   0.247 1.816 0.071
Yield index of private firms at year t–12  PV
g t Y −   6 θ   0.00022 -2.740 0.007
The proportion of the total area seeded to hybrid 
(HYB) varieties for public firm at time t 
PUB
t i HYB ,   7 θ   –3.996 -0.842 0.401
Plant Breeders’ Right dummy for private/public 
firm in year t 
t PBR   8 θ   –8.140 -1.628 0.105
TUA (technical use agreement) revenue for public 
firm in year t 
PUB
t i TUREV ,   9 θ   7.738 1.393 0.165
Revenue of private firm 1 in year t–1  PV
t R 1 , 1 −   1 λ   1.199 7.258 0.000
Intercept private firm 1  Constant 
01 α   24.777 2.377 0.019
Revenue of private firm 2 in year t–1  PV
t R 1 , 2 −   2 λ   0.412 3.763 0.000
Intercept private firm 2  Constant 
02 α   25.347 2.434 0.016
Revenue of private firm 3 in year t–1  PV
t R 1 , 3 −   3 λ   0.882 14.516 0.000
Intercept private firm 3  Constant 
03 α   22.105 2.115 0.036
Revenue of private firm 4 in year t–1  PV
t R 1 , 4 −   4 λ   0.497 6.137 0.000
Intercept private firm 4  Constant 
04 α   25.885 2.492 0.014
Revenue of private firm 5 in year t–1  PV
t R 1 , 5 −   5 λ   0.636 10.483 0.000
Intercept private firm 5  Constant 
05 α   25.844 2.484 0.014
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Table 2: Regression Results of Model 2 (continued) 
Dependent Variable: Revenue of private firm i in year t: 
PV
t i R ,  public firm j in year t: 
PUB
t j R ,  
Variable  Acronym    Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
 
Revenue of public firm 1 in year t–1  PUB
t R 1 , 1 −   6 λ   0.437 3.428 0.001
Intercept public firm 1  constant 
06 θ   41.328 4.419 0.000
Revenue of public firm 2 in year t–1  PUB
t R 1 , 2 −   7 λ   0.383 2.714 0.007
Intercept private firm 2  constant 
07 θ   –16.897 -1.160 0.248
Determinant residual covariance: 6.83E+08, 
2 R : 0.467 – 0.963 
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Table 3: Regression Results of Model 3 
Dependant variables:  Social revenue of private firm i in year t: 
PV
t i SR ,  public firm: 
PUB
t j SR ,  
Variable  Acronym    Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Private applied research expenditures in year t–11  PV
k t i AR − ,   1 ϕ   1.846 1.730 0.085
Basic research expenditures in year t–7 1 ϕ   l t BR −   2 ϕ   0.806 2.273 0.024
Total applied research expenditures of other-
private firms in year t–8 
PV
r t i OAR − ,   3 ϕ   –1.962 -3.774 0.000
Total applied research expenditures of public firms 
in year t–13 
PUB
m t AR −   4 ϕ   1.067 2.284 0.024
Plant Breeders’ Right dummy in year t 
t PBR   5 ϕ   29.947 5.083 0.000
Public applied research expenditures in year t–11  PUB
k t j AR − ,   1 µ   5.236 2.981 0.003
Basic research expenditures in year t–7 
l t BR −   2 µ   –5.727 -3.173 0.002
Total applied research expenditures of other-public 
firms in year t–8 
PUB
r t j OAR − ,   3 µ   –6.243 -3.117 0.002
Total applied research expenditures of private 
firms in year t–13 
PV
m t AR −   4 µ   2.915 1.215 0.226
Plant Breeders’ Right dummy in year t 
t PBR   5 µ   –42.473 -1.851 0.066
Social revenue of private firm 1 in year t–1  PV
t SR 1 , 1 −   1 ρ   0.764 7.001 0.000
Intercept private firm 1  constant 
01 ϕ   –3.569 -0.634 0.527
Social revenue of private firm 2 in year t–1  PV
t SR 1 , 2 −   2 ρ   0.221 2.043 0.043
Intercept private firm 2  constant 
02 ϕ   –4.157 -1.163 0.246
Social revenue of private firm 3 in year t–1  PV
t SR 1 , 3 −   3 ρ   0.726 9.972 0.000
Intercept private firm 3  constant 
03 ϕ   0.088 0.013 0.990
Social revenue of private firm 4 in year t–1  PV
t SR 1 , 4 −   4 ρ   0.697 9.390 0.000
Intercept private firm 4  constant 
04 ϕ   –14.000 -1.286 0.200
Social revenue of private firm 5 in year t–1  PV
t SR 1 , 5 −   5 ρ   0.697 8.560 0.000
Intercept private firm 5  constant 
05 ϕ   –1.597 -0.292 0.771
Social revenue of public firm 1 in year t–1  PUB
t SR 1 , 1 −   6 ρ   0.425 3.377 0.001
Intercept public firm 1  Constant 
06 ϕ   210.067 5.205 0.000
Social revenue of private firm 2 in year t–1  PUB
t SR 1 , 2 −   7 ρ   0.587 4.642 0.000
Intercept private firm 2  Constant 
07 ϕ   62.267 3.526 0.001
 Determinant residual covariance: 3.63E+18
2 R : 0.342 – 0.890 
Source: Authors’ regression estimates 15 
Footnotes for the main body 
1   We were unable to find any data reporting the amount of basic research undertaken by private 
firms and therefore cannot estimate this effect.  Industry experts indicated that this activity was 
very limited in private firms. 
2  The input use data was collected in terms of the number of scientist years per firm. This was 
converted to real dollar terms using the estimated 2003 $/scientist ratio to facilitate easier 
comparison with the equations estimated in Models 2 and 3.   1 
Appendix A: Data Description 
This appendix describes the source and the calculations used to construct each of the variables 
required for the econometric analysis. 
Research Expenditure on Canola 
Developing the time series for public and private research expenditures from 1960 to 1999 required 
the combination of several sources of data and several calculations because no single source spanned 
the time period and some sources were more accurate than others for some types of expenditures.  For 
all of the calculations, the total research expenditure per year was calculated by multiplying the total 
(professional and technical) person-years employed in research each year by the 1999 total research 
costs per person (Canola Research Survey, 1999).  To avoid the problem of double-counting, the 
research expenditure is calculated at the final recipient level.  Data on canola research person-years 
were obtained from five sources: Canola Research Survey (1999); Nagy and Furtan (1977, 1978); ISI 
(Institute for Scientific Investigation) (1997); Phillips (1997); and ICAR (Inventory of Canadian 
Agri-Food Research) (1998 and 2000).   
  Canadian universities’ total person-years were based on an ISI special tabulation of academic 
publications (from 1981 to 1996) and ICAR data (from 1977 to 1980) (for the 1978 value the average 
of 1977 and 1979 was used).  Prior to 1976, when ICAR data were not available, Nagy and Furtan 
(1977, 1978) was used, with some adjustments.  Comparing the Nagy and Furtan estimates of total 
professional person-years at Canadian universities to the ICAR estimates of total professional years, 
the former were underestimated by 62 percent.  Hence, the Nagy and Furtan estimates were adjusted 
by multiplying by 2.64.  The data were updated by applying the average value of the last three 
available years to the 1997, 1998, and 1999 values. 
  Non-Canadian universities’ total person-years were based on an ISI special tabulation of 
academic publications (from 1981 to 1997), and on Phillips (1997) (from 1960 to 1980).  Comparing 
the ISI special tabulation of non-Canadian academic total person-years to the Phillips’ estimate (for 
the overlapping years 1981 and 1982), the former was underestimated by 23 percent.  Hence, Phillips’ 
estimates were adjusted by multiplying by 1.3.  The non-Canadian universities’ total person-years 
figure was updated following the same methodology as the Canadian universities’ total person-years.   
  AAFC total person-years were based on ICAR data (1998 and 2000) from 1977 to 1999 (for 
the 1978 value the average of 1977 and 1979 was used), and Nagy and Furtan (1977, 1978) (from 
1960 to 1976).  Comparing the Nagy and Furtan estimate of professional person-years to the ICAR 
estimate of total professional years, the former represented only 30 percent of the total person-years.  
Hence, the Nagy and Furtan (1977, 1978) estimates were adjusted accordingly.   
  The estimation of public expenditures on basic and applied research was based on the ICAR 
database and the public research expenditure (as described above).  Upon request, ICAR personally 
provided us with project descriptions and subcategories of research in the 556 projects undertaken 
over the years on canola research. With the help of experts in crop science, the research in each 
project was divided into basic and applied research, and then aggregated to calculate the percentage 
of basic and applied research in each year.  This percentage for the ICAR-listed projects was applied 
to all reported public research expenditures on canola, which resulted in a time series of public 
expenditures on basic and on applied research. 
The estimation of the private companies’ professional years was based on the Canola 
Research Survey (1999), a detailed firm-level study undertaken by Peter Phillips and others at the 
University of Saskatchewan.  
 
Yield index 
The annual yield index by firm was created from an average of the yield index for the firm’s varieties 
grown each year, weighted by the seeded acreage.
i  The relative yields of different canola varieties 
were obtained from various issues of Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food, Varieties of Grain Crops 
in Saskatchewan (various issues), which are based on annual side-by-side variety yield trails at 2 
several locations in the province.
ii  The data on the percentage of acreage sown to each canola variety 
were obtained from four sources: Nagy and Furtan (1978); various issues of Prairie Pools Inc., 
Prairies Grain Variety Survey (1977–1992); and the authors’ estimates based on Manitoba Crop 
Insurance Corporation, Variety Survey (December 2002) and Alberta Crop Insurance Corporation, 
Variety Survey (December 2002).
iii   
 
Variety Classification 
Information on the types of rapeseed/canola varieties (Polish/Argentine), the breeders, the year of 
introduction, the variety’s production system (open-pollinated, synthetic, hybrids), the variety’s 
reproduction system (conventional versus herbicide-tolerant e.g., Roundup Ready®, Clearfield®, 
Liberty®), which allowed us to classify each canola variety, was collected from the following 
sources: Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food, Varieties of Grain Crops in Saskatchewan (various 
issues); CFIA (Canadian Food Inspection Agency) (1998, 2002, 2003); Alberta Agriculture and Food, 
2003 Agronomic Performance Data for all Crops and Regions (2002, 2003); Manitoba Agriculture 
and Food, 2003 Variety Guide for Oilseeds and Special Crops (2003); Paterson and Sons Limited 
Grain Buyer, Polish and Argentine Canola Varieties (2003); Alberta Seed Industry, New in 2001: 
Canola, Flax, and Mustard Varieties – 2001 (2003); and Canola Council of Canada, Argentine 
Varieties and Polish Varieties (2002, 2003). 
 
Argentine and Biotechnology Variables  
(herbicide-tolerant (HT); hybrid (HYB); plant breeders’ rights (PBRs)) 
To capture the effect of cultivating herbicide-tolerant (HT) and synthetic/hybrid canola 
varieties (HYB), a variable was created that show the proportion of the total canola area seeded to 
varieties that are either HT or hybrids.  The HYB variables take a value between 0 and 1 (for details 
on the sources of varieties’ classification see above).   
  The effect of Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBRs) was incorporated by creating a PBR dummy 
variable.  This variable takes the value of 0 before the PBR act came into force August 1, 1990 
(Canada Department of Justice, 2000), and 1 thereafter.   
 
Price and Revenue Variables  
(Private Revenue; Technical Use Agreement (TUA) Revenue; Social Revenue) 
The farm gate price of canola/rapeseed in Canada was based on Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food, 
Agricultural Statistics 2002. The farm gate price of canola as well as all the revenue variables were 
expressed as 2001 Canadian dollars per tonne as deflated by the consumer price index.  The data for 
the consumer price index (CPI) were obtained from Statistics Canada, Direct CANSIM Time Series: 
CPI and All Goods for Canada (January 2003).  
The annual revenue by firm is the product of the price charged for each variety and the 
seeded acreage for each variety (for details on the sources of the area data see “Yield Index”).  The 
price data of canola varieties was obtained from various issues of Canola Council of Canada, 
Economic Analysis: CPC Annual Reports (2002)
 iv; SeCan (2002); Saskatchewan Agriculture and 
Food (2002); and the authors’ estimates based on the above sources.
v   
The Technical Use Agreement (TUA) fees or their annual rents equivalent were obtained 
from various issues of Canola Council of Canada, Economic Analysis: CPC Annual Reports (2002) 
and authors’ estimates.
vi  The TUA revenue was calculated by multiplying the TUA fees/equivalent 
and the area seeded per each canola variety per year.   
Finally, the estimation of the annual social revenue produced by each firm each year was 
based on the notion that social value can be broken down to yield-induced increase and the herbicide 
cost savings reflected in the TUA fees.  The estimated value of the yield increase from firm i in year t 
begins with the calculation of the commercial value of the product grown to their varieties, which is 
the product of the area Ait, the price of canola, Pt, and the average commercial yield in year t, Yt. The 
social value of the yield increase attributed to firm i is this commercial value multiplied by the 3 
proportional yield increase over the 1960 yield, or (Yit – Y0)/Y0.      The total social revenue is 
herbicide TUA revenues plus the value of the yield increase or:  
SRit = RTUAit + P t *Yt




   
 
 
   Ait       ( 4 )  
where: 
it SR is the social revenue of firm i in year t 
RTUAit is the TUA (technical use agreement) revenue of firm i in year t 
t P  is the farm gate price of canola in year t 
t Y is the annual average weighted yield index of the Argentine canola varieties in year t 
it Y is the weighted yield index of the Argentine canola varieties of firm i in year t 
0 Y is the annual average weighted yield index of the Argentine canola varieties in year t=0 (1960) 
it A is the area seeded of each canola variety of firm i in year t 4 
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Footnotes for the Appendix A 
                                                 
i   The relative yield index of different canola varieties was converted to the same variety base 
(Torch) (1976=100).  The yield index for each variety is obtained from the last reported value 
because it is thought to be a more accurate estimate of the actual yield performance.   
ii   Unfortunately, the whole series was not available from other provinces, so the data from 
Saskatchewan is used as a national proxy, which may be a reasonable approximation given that 
Saskatchewan is located in the centre of the canola-growing region.    
iii   The proportion of acres grown in Manitoba and Alberta was used to create the weighted average 
after 1990, which applied to the total canola acreage in the prairies (Statistics Canada, Direct 
CANSIM Time Series: Prairie Provinces; Seeded Area; Canola (Rapeseed), December 2002). 
iv   The Canola Council data set was reduced by the average seed treatment costs for canola.  The 
determination of the average seed treatment price for canola from 1991 to 2001 was based on 
David Blais (2003) (personal communication) and Jim Rogers (2003) (personal communication).   
v   Gaps in the data were filled in using the calculated annual average price of the canola seed per 
type per year or/and forecasting the seed price using the existing data as the underlying trend.   
vi   Monsanto charges a $15 TUA per-acre fee for all Roundup-Ready canola grown to extract value 
from producers. Two other companies that promote the development of herbicide-tolerant canola 
varieties, BASF (Clearfield canola sprayed with Odyssey herbicide) and Aventis (Liberty-Link 
canola sprayed with Liberty Herbicide), hold patents on the herbicides and can set the price 
wherever they want.  The prices of Liberty and Odyssey herbicides are quite high when compared 
with Roundup.  The calculated TUA per-acre equivalents for these varieties are based on the 
notion that if BASF and Aventis faced a competitive market for their herbicides they could be 
expected to sell their chemical for the price of Roundup, the excess revenue being rents.  The 
herbicide costs used for this calculation was Roundup $8.15/acre, Odyssey $20.38/acre, and 
Liberty $18.50/acre.   